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1 INTRODUCTION1
Of the many scientific issues relevant to society today, one issue that is 
increasingly regarded as particularly urgent is anthropogenic climate change. 
There is robust scientific evidence that the earth’s average surface tem-
perature has warmed over the last century and that this is primarily due to 
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases – specifically CO2 – into the 
atmosphere (IPCC, 2013, p. 17ff). Almost all of the world’s countries have 
underwritten the 2015 Paris Agreement, which expresses the intention of 
limiting global warming to 1.5–2 °C above pre-industrial levels by the year 
2100, by radically reducing global emissions of greenhouse gasses. Several 
scientists and policymakers are sceptical about the feasibility of this target, 
however, and recent analyses of the world’s progress towards achieving the 
Paris goals give little reason for optimism (e.g. UNEP, 2019).
While the causal mechanisms of climate change, as well as the likely con-
sequences of global warming, are questions of science rather than philosophy, 
climate change gives rise to a variety of concerns that are of great interest to 
academic philosophers. To name just a few, consider the following:
Philosophy of science: The models that climate scientists use to forecast 
future states of the earth’s climate (such as so-called general circulation mod-
els – GCMs) are incredibly complex and take input from a range of evidential 
sources. How do these models relate to reality? What uncertainties do they 
involve?
1 This chapter was written with the support of an NWO Rubicon grant. I thank Wouter Kalf, 
Lukas Meyer, Norbert Paulo, Thomas Pölzler, Elias Moser and Daniel Sharp for their helpful 
comments.
Chapter 11
Shall We Adapt? Evolutionary Ethics 
and Climate Change
Jeroen Hopster
16028-0337dr2.indd   195 27-02-2020   19:49:45
196 Chapter 11
Philosophy of economics: Economists incorporate GCMs in so-called inte-
grated assessment models (IAMs), which are used to calculate the expected 
costs and benefits of different policies in the face of global warming. What are 
the normative assumptions underlying IAMs? For instance, what discount rates 
do they employ, and are these morally justifiable?
Scientific epistemology: It is of great importance to examine the epistemic 
credentials of scientific claims regarding climate change, especially given the 
substantial amount of societal distrust towards climate science. For instance, 
what is the value of expert consensus among climate scientists, and what is the 
value of dissent?
Moral epistemology: Societal controversy also pertains to the ethics of cli-
mate change and makes questions of moral epistemology particularly acute. 
How should moral deliberation about climate change proceed? Are there moral 
experts involved in such deliberation, and if so, what is the nature of their 
expertise?
Global justice: The atmospheric capacity to absorb CO2 might be regarded 
as a scarce resource, the global distribution of which is a matter of justice. On 
average, the countries of the Global North have historically contributed the 
most to global warming and are currently most invested in a CO2 intensive 
lifestyle, whereas the countries of the Global South are likely to suffer the worst 
consequences of global warming, at least in the short term. In the face of these 
inequalities, what would be a fair policy regarding future CO2 reductions?
Intergenerational justice: Additionally, since CO2 remains in the atmosphere 
for long periods of time, the warming effects of CO2 emissions are cumulative, 
and their distribution is a matter of future-oriented intergenerational justice. 
What responsibilities do we have towards future generations? How should we 
accommodate the interests of future people in moral decision-making?
Risk ethics: Current levels of global CO2 emissions pose clear risks for the 
well-being of future generations and jeopardize the continued existence of sev-
eral entities and artefacts that the present generation takes to be of value. But 
over the long term, the dynamics and impacts of climate change are also riddled 
with uncertainties. What decision-procedure should we follow in the face of 
these uncertainties? For instance, should we endorse a version of the precaution-
ary principle, and if so, how should this principle be spelled out?
Environmental and animal ethics: Climate change also raises concerns 
about the moral significance of the non-human world. Why, if at all, does bio-
diversity matter? Are all extinctions equally bad? How should we evaluate the 
interests of human individuals versus the interests of non-human animals?
This list contains a sample of philosophical topics and questions that can 
be addressed in the context of climate change. My aim is not to provide a full 
inventory of such topics, nor to defend the societal relevance of philosophi-
cal work in this area; I take it that for readers of this chapter, such relevance 
is obvious from the questions posed. Moreover, there is an excellent body of 
existing philosophical literature, which treats many of these topics – such as 
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the philosophy of climate science (e.g. Winsberg, 2018), climate ethics (e.g. 
Gardiner, 2011), climate justice (e.g. Meyer & Sanklecha, 2017) and climate 
scepticism (e.g. Oreskes & Conway, 2010) – in great detail.
Instead, in this chapter, I aim to make a different contribution, by explor-
ing a topic in climate ethics that has not received much prior treatment: the 
intersection between climate change and evolutionary ethics (to be defined 
in the next section). I will discuss three ways in which these topics are con-
nected and will argue for the relevance of examining these connections, both 
for academic philosophy and for society at large.
Why address this specific topic in the context of the present volume? First, 
both evolutionary ethics and climate change are issues of great concern to 
Herman Philipse, to whom this volume is dedicated; addressing them in 
tandem seems apt for a publication in his honour.2 Second, my discussion 
of them serves to illustrate a specific thesis regarding philosophy’s societal 
relevance. I argue that academic philosophy is well positioned to fulfil a 
societal role that is particularly important in our age of popular science: to 
raise awareness of the ethical predicaments to which scientific findings give 
rise, and to highlight the normative assumptions implicit in the reasoning of 
scientists who speak out about societal issues. When it comes to evolutionary 
considerations in the face of climate change, popular science claims (e.g. ‘our 
brains are wired to ignore climate change’ – see the title of Marshall’s (2014) 
book) are easy to find. So are claims voiced by scientists that are presented 
as matters of scientific fact, but in fact mask ethical assumptions, as I will 
illustrate in section 3. While unmasking such assumptions is by no means the 
only societal function of academic philosophy, doing so is an important task, 
and I will argue that philosophers are well trained to fulfil it.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 starts with a very broad 
characterization of evolutionary ethics and goes on to articulate a narrower 
way in which an ‘evolutionary ethics approach’ can be understood: as an 
approach to historical moral learning. I argue that in the context of climate 
change, this approach yields the insight that the long-term consequences of 
global warming place us in a situation of significant uncertainty, precisely 
because these long-term consequences are without historical precedent, 
and the conditions of historical moral learning break down. In section 3, 
I highlight one of the perils of looking at the phenomenon of climate 
change through an evolutionary lens: It can invite specific fallacies and 
2 Herman Philipse was the principal investigator of the NWO (Netherlands Organization for 
 Scientific Research) project ‘Evolutionary Ethics’ (2014–2019), in which I conducted my PhD 
research. Additionally, over the last decade, he has given several courses and lectures on the topic of 
climate change. It has been a great pleasure to discuss these topics with Herman and to learn from 
him about both of them. Some of the views expressed in this chapter have taken inspiration from 
his ideas.
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contribute to moral corruption. Taking the work of the Dutch geologist 
Salomon Kroonenberg as an example, I focus on one such fallacy, which 
I call ‘geological relativism’: the unwarranted trivialization of the ethical 
significance of climate change, due to selective attention for geological 
timescales. In section 4, I look at the relevance of evolutionary moral 
psychology for climate ethics. I argue that insights from psychology can 
contribute to the efficacy of climate action and that evolutionary consid-
erations may provide an extra layer of understanding to these insights. 
However, an evolutionary perspective can also be counterproductive, if it 
is mistakenly taken to negate the plasticity of people’s moral attitudes and 
the institutional malleability of moral behaviour. That said, I submit that 
evolutionary limitations do tell us something important, especially at the 
institutional level: Our institutions have not evolved under the right pres-
sures to deal adequately with the problem of climate change. In section 5, 
I conclude by highlighting two distinct societal contributions that academic 
philosophy can make, as gatekeepers of the public debate and communica-
tors of interdisciplinary perspectives.
2 PRESSURES FROM THE PAST
To a first approximation, we may understand ‘evolutionary ethics’ as a catch-
all term for inquiries in moral philosophy, which take evolutionary insights 
to be specifically relevant to their own approach or object of study. This is an 
ecumenical understanding; evolutionary ethics, thus understood, is compat-
ible with various views in normative ethics and metaethics, and subsumes 
a range of ethical inquiries (for an overview, see Ruse & Richards, 2017)). 
Contemporary examples include descriptive inquiries into evolutionary moral 
psychology (e.g. Sinnott-Armstrong, 2008), so-called evolutionary debunk-
ing arguments (e.g. Wielenberg, 2017), as well as approaches that aspire to 
vindicate ethical claims on the basis of an evolutionary or historical geneal-
ogy (e.g. Kitcher, 2011).
In the present section, I restrict my discussion to the latter kind of approach 
in evolutionary ethics and assess its relevance for coming to terms with the 
predicaments of global warming.3 This is quite a specific strand of evolution-
ary ethics, which may not be familiar to all readers. I will first spend some 
paragraphs unpacking the general view – roughly, the view that moral knowl-
edge comes about through evolutionary and historical processes. Thereafter, 
3 I have engaged with other strands of evolutionary ethics elsewhere: In Hopster (2018, 2019), 
I evaluate the success of evolutionary debunking arguments against moral realism, whereas Hopster 
and Klenk (2019) scrutinize the evolutionary origins of moral objectivism.
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I indicate how this view might be relevant in coming to terms with climate 
risks and uncertainty.
The view I have in mind gives substance to Dewey’s observation that 
‘moral conceptions and processes grow naturally out of the very conditions 
of human life’ (Dewey, 1932, p. 308). Let us assume, along the lines of prag-
matists like Dewey and Kitcher, that the accumulation of moral knowledge 
is a historical process, and that accumulating moral knowledge amounts to 
moral progress.4 If so, then history itself can be regarded as a source of moral 
knowledge. In fact, it constitutes such a source in two distinct senses.
First, the process of acquiring moral knowledge is a process of societal 
learning, that has taken place throughout human (pre-)history. Through trial 
and error, societies have learned what kinds of interactions are beneficial to 
human cooperation, what institutions are conducive to human flourishing 
and how problems of social life can be resolved. For instance, the traumatic 
experience of the two World Wars heightened societal awareness of the need 
to codify universal human rights and to create effective institutions of global 
governance, and led inter alia to the foundation of the United Nations (1945) 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948). The Haitian slave 
revolt (1791–1804) undermined colonialist assumptions about the inferior-
ity of slaves and substantially contributed to a growing recognition of the 
wrongness of slavery (Anderson, 2016). Going further back in time, the acts 
of free-riders and noncooperators gave rise to institutions of moralized pun-
ishment, which arguably played an important role in early stages of hominid 
moral evolution (Boyd, Gintis, Bowles, & Richerson, 2003). All of these are 
examples of societal and evolutionary pressures which steered moral adap-
tations that most people would nowadays regard as improvements – hence, 
instances of moral progress.
That we can discern historical episodes of moral progress is not to say that 
such progress has been linear, nor that the process of historical moral learning 
has been completed. Episodes of historical moral regress are plentiful, and 
the moral deficits of today’s societies are apparent to many of us. Moreover, 
there is little reason to think that the process of moral learning could ever be 
completed: The question of what ends are worth pursuing is a matter of ongo-
ing societal dialogue, the dynamics of which are steered by the accumulation 
of factual knowledge, changes in societies’ technological capacities, as well 
the greater or lesser inclusion of different voices and interests in societal 
deliberation. But these and other caveats notwithstanding, a good case can be 
made that on the whole, when looking back at human history, thus far we see 
4 I regard it as a common sense assumption that moral progress is possible (though by no means 
omnipresent), but I am aware that this assumption is not metaethically uncontroversial. Here I pro-
ceed on the assumption that the common sense assumption is correct. For plausible defences of moral 
progress, see Kitcher (2011); Buchanan and Powell (2018).
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more signs of moral progress than moral regress. Societies have learned from 
historical experience, and over time, they have adopted institutions, codes 
and practices, which we now regard as changes for the better. Whether such 
changes are understood in terms of a moral realist framework (Huemer, 2016) 
or in an antirealist fashion (Hopster, 2019), what matters for present purposes 
that they are indeed progressive changes. Indeed, some codes and practices 
have been quite resilient, such as moral prohibitions on stealing, which have 
been used to deter noncooperators from prehistorical times up until the pres-
ent. These constitute ‘fixed-points’ of moral discourse, which are associated 
with moral judgements (e.g. ‘stealing is bad’) that, because of their ability 
to withstand societal scrutiny, can be regarded as objective moral truths (cf. 
Hopster, 2017).
In sum, the first sense in which history has contributed to moral learning is 
that it has yielded moral institutions and moral insights that, on average, have 
been progressive. Let us call this the experiential level of historical moral 
learning. The second sense, which I will call the intellectual level of historical 
moral learning, is that knowledge about history can itself be considered as a 
reservoir of moral insight. For instance, historical case studies may teach gen-
eral lessons about the risks of what can happen when demagogues come to 
power, when market economies are left unchecked, or when armed conflicts 
escalate. There are limits to such case studies: History never repeats itself in 
detail, and whether or not a given situation in the present is relevantly similar 
to a given situation in the past can often only be recognized with hindsight. 
Nonetheless, some kinds of historical processes may be sufficiently robust to 
warrant generalizations, such as processes that can be explained at population 
level (Sterelny, 2016), or the rise and fall of societies steered by climatologi-
cal changes that occur over the longue durée of human history.
Now why think that climate change is relevant in the context of historical 
moral learning? First, consider the experiential level. The anticipated short-
term impacts of global warming include, among other things, more days 
with hot extremes, heavy precipitation in some regions, droughts and pre-
cipitation deficits in others, more frequent forest fires, floods, net reductions 
in crop yields, water stress and species loss (IPCC, 2018). All of these are 
phenomena with which many human societies are intimately acquainted and 
have had troublesome experiences in the recent past. That extreme weather 
phenomena, and their associated impacts, will increase both in frequency and 
intensity is uncalled for, and this can be felt from historical experience. Con-
sider the 2019 floods in Mozambique, aqua alta in Venice, and the Australian 
wildfires around the turn of 2020. These events may have served to heighten 
awareness among the general population of the short-term hazards that come 
along with climate change. Of course, their occurrence was not required to 
intellectually grasp the risks of global warming, but they may have affected 
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the felt urgency of the problem and may have bred a greater sensitivity for the 
moral dimensions of climate change. If they did, then these examples qualify 
as instances of societal moral learning by historical experience.
At the intellectual level, historical analogies may fuel ideas about what 
is adequate, feasible or necessary to do in the face of climate change. Such 
analogies may take inspiration from historical episodes of moral progress. 
For instance, in his movie An Inconvenient Sequel (2017), Al Gore places the 
climate movement in the tradition of the American civil rights movement; in 
her book This Changes Everything, Naomi Klein (2014) likens the challenges 
of abandoning our reliance on fossil fuels to abolishing the slave economy; 
in the Stern Review (2007), Nicholas Stern compares the economic risks 
of climate change to a permanent economic depression similar to the crisis 
during the great wars. Apart from historical analogies focused on human 
societies, knowledge from the past might also foster insight into the potential 
cascade effects of rapid climate change, which can help to fuel our moral out-
look. For instance, some scientists have argued that the current epoch in the 
earth’s history bears resemblances to the ‘Great Dying’ that happened at the 
end of the Permian (252 mya), when 96 per cent of all species went extinct 
(Penn, Deutsch, Payne, & Sperling, 2018). Others maintain that in terms of 
the paleoclimatic events of the past, the warming that took place during the 
Paleocene – Eocene Thermal Maximum of 56 mya (which did not trigger one 
of the earth’s major extinction events) provides a better comparison to our 
current climatological condition (McInerney & Wing, 2011).
But while such analogies can breed insight, they also have limitations. 
CO2 molecules are quite unlike slaves, climate change is not a war, and the 
Anthropocene is very different from the Permian. Drawing historical analo-
gies serves an important moral purpose, but with respect to the current epi-
sode of climate change, the disanalogies are substantial and should caution us 
not to frame our present predicament too narrowly as a repetition of the past.
This brings me to a general point about climate change, which specifi-
cally pertains to its long-term impact. Not only is this impact riddled with 
uncertainties, but it also places us under conditions where history provides 
little guidance. Much of recorded human history has taken place in an era 
when the climate was remarkably stable, with swings of average surface 
temperature ranging around 1 °C. While climate change did influence 
historical societies, it never did so at the pace of change that scientists 
currently anticipate, never at the same global scale, and – perhaps most 
significantly – never in a situation where societies were capable of respond-
ing not just in terms of adaptation, but also in terms of mitigation. To find a 
more drastic example of climate change we have to go back to the last ice 
age. But for purposes of comparison with the present, this is a problematic 
reference class, both because the average surface temperature was much 
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lower and because the last ice age happened during human prehistory. The 
Last Glacial Maximum (LGM) occurred approximately 21 kya, which was 
a time when agricultural human societies did not exist, and a sedentary life-
style was infrequent at best. While it may be interesting to study paleoan-
thropological findings about how societies adapted to these circumstances, 
and especially how they adapted to the ensuing period of temperature rise, 
the lessons these findings might provide with regard to our present predica-
ment seem to be limited.
One might think that this is indicative of a limitation of the ‘evolutionary 
approach’ to ethical learning I am outlining here. Ideally, we would like to 
take lessons from history that are relevant in the current context of global 
warming, for instance, by learning how adaptable past human societies have 
been to temperature rises similar to those of the present. We would like his-
tory to give us an indication of how well we can cope, and of what ought 
to be done. But unfortunately, historical precedents are lacking; hence, the 
approach arguably falls short.
Myself, however, I do not subscribe to this diagnosis. Rather than being a 
flaw of the approach, I submit that the absence of historical precedents in fact 
teaches us an important ethical lesson about the climate risks we are currently 
facing. The fact that the long-term impact of anthropogenic climate change 
is historically unprecedented, and that conditions of historical learning break 
down, implies that some of the more worrisome scenarios painted by scien-
tists, which might have otherwise been discredited as being overly fanciful 
and historically unrealistic, should be entertained as serious possibilities. We 
are venturing into unknown territory, which makes it very difficult to state 
with reassuring confidence that the catastrophic scenarios that some scientists 
envision are wildly improbable. Moreover, we are confronted with conditions 
that we, during the era of advanced human civilization, have not previously 
learned to cope with. As the climate economist William Nordhaus (2013) 
ponders:
The last 7,000 years have been the most stable climatic period in more than 
100,000 years. This is a sobering finding because this is also the period that has 
witnessed the emergence of written languages, cities, and human civilizations. 
Was climate stability a prerequisite for the emergence of farming and cities? 
Would the Sumerians have developed the first written language if they had 
been confronted with an unstable climate system? How would philosophy and 
literature have developed in Greece if the city-states were suddenly plunged 
into an ice age?
We cannot really tell; historical experience is lacking. We can, however, 
generate some impression of the scale of disruption that sudden climate 
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change would create. Consider once more the ice age analogy, understood 
as a resource for intellectual (rather than experiential) moral knowledge. 
While I noted that the insight the ice age can provide with regard to our 
present predicament is limited, it is not altogether absent. One relevant 
analogy concerns the range of temperature differences that the next gen-
eration might face. With some margin of uncertainty, the average surface 
temperature during the last ice age is typically estimated to be of an order of 
5–7 °C lower than the present (IPCC, 2013, p. 124). A 5–7 °C temperature 
increase above pre-industrial levels, in turn, is among the extreme predic-
tions for the twenty-first century, but might well be within the plausible 
temperature range at some point during the twenty-second century, if we 
extrapolate from current IPCC (2013) projections. What would the impact 
of this temperature rise be? The last ice age provides some indirect clues: 
During the LGM, the northern part of America and Northwest Eurasia 
were covered by continental ice sheets, with large tundra steppes below; 
sea levels were much lower, and one could have walked from present-day 
Amsterdam to Dublin, or from Siberia to Alaska. As the philosopher John 
Broome (2012, p. 130) conjectures: ‘Five degrees of cooling gave us an ice-
age; six degrees of warming must be expected to give us dramatic effects 
in the other direction’.
Of course, the ice age analogy does not tell us exactly which changes to 
expect, but it does provide a relevant comparison class by illustrating how 
dramatic such changes might be. Moreover, it drives home the point that what 
seems to be a relatively small swing in the earth’s average surface tempera-
ture can have a huge impact on the climate system. In doing so, it makes it 
easier to appreciate that global warming poses serious long-term risks, which 
are highly relevant from an ethical point of view. These risks involve the 
prospect that intergenerational projects will have to be aborted, that structures 
erected over the ages will have to be abandoned, and that conditions ame-
nable to human flourishing will degrade.
We conclude our first exploration of the intersections between climate 
change and evolutionary ethics, having arrived at a surprising insight. Ini-
tially, it seemed that the pragmatist approach towards evolutionary ethics 
which I have outlined – the view that moral knowledge itself comes about 
through evolutionary and historical processes – is of limited use to climate 
ethics, since in the context of anthropogenic global warming the conditions 
for historical moral learning largely break down. But on further thought, this 
very breakdown provides an important clue about the kind of uncertainty we 
are currently facing – a clue that is likely to be relevant in the context of risk 
ethics, and may help, for instance, to articulate a version of the precautionary 
principle tailored to climate risks.
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3 THE FALLACY OF GEOLOGICAL RELATIVISM
Our brief excursion to the ice age testifies to the fact that the earth’s climate 
has not been stable throughout history. Ice ages came and went at regular 
intervals during hominid evolution. Going further back in time, there have 
been periods when the earth was a tropical planet with sea levels that are 
much higher than nowadays, periods when much of our planet was a des-
sert, as well as periods when the entire planet was covered in ice. Human 
emissions are causing the rapid pace with which the global temperature is 
currently warming up, and this is a novel phenomenon. Climate change as 
such is not.
Does the ‘deep history’ of climate change have any moral significance? 
The Dutch geologist Salomon Kroonenberg, a well-known contributor to 
the public debate about climate change in the Netherlands, believes so. In a 
lecture about the geological history of the earth’s climate, he states (Kroonen-
berg 2009, my translation from Dutch):
The climate is changing. You read it in the newspapers, you hear it on the radio, 
you see it on television. Hearing all of it, you think: the earth is upset. It’s not 
like it used to be. And we have done that. (. . .) [Upon learning about the IPCC’s 
projections] you think: Yes, of course this is worrisome. The climate should not 
be changing. But I want to provide a bit of perspective. Because in fact, you can 
only answer the question of whether this is worrisome, if you look a bit further 
back in time, and consider how the climate has been in the past.
This quote is representative of Kroonenberg’s general outlook, which he 
has expressed in several books, lectures and newspaper articles. Only in the 
context of the geological deep history of the earth – for by ‘looking a bit 
further back in time’ he means looking at geological timescales of millions of 
years, which is his area of expertise – can we appreciate the significance of 
present-day climate change.
In this section, I take issue with Kroonenberg’s view and argue that he 
commits a moral fallacy, which I dub the fallacy of ‘geological relativism’. 
Kroonenberg’s paleoclimatic expertise is unquestionable; as a purely scien-
tific matter, I endorse his contention that the question of whether anthropo-
genic climate change is historically unprecedented, or rather a repetition on 
a familiar theme, should be answered against the background of all paleocli-
matic evidence. However, the way in which Kroonenberg frames the ques-
tion is not scientific, but ethical. He asks his listeners whether anthropogenic 
global warming is worrisome, and subsequently intends to downplay any 
worries listeners might have by elucidating that dramatic shifts in the earth’s 
climate are by no means unique.
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From an ethical point of view, this reasoning is confused. The confusion 
stems from the fact that Kroonenberg ties the ethical question of whether cli-
mate change is worrisome to the geological question of whether the earth, or 
life as such, can endure it – and using geological phenomena that have played 
out over thousands to millions of years as his frame of reference, he argues 
that it can. But this is a red herring. What makes global warming a pressing 
ethical concern has little to do with the assertion, whether correct or not, that 
our planet has faced similar climatic changes in the deep past. In fact, the 
climatic changes of the deep past are entirely irrelevant to the ethical gravity 
of the changes occurring in the present. Since the climatic changes Kroonen-
berg refers to happened long before humans occupied deltas and cultivated 
farmlands – indeed, given that his toy examples concern climatic changes that 
happened before Homo sapiens even existed – they do not speak to the issues 
that are most obviously at stake in our current moral context.
We may grant that the planet itself will endure anthropogenic climate 
change, and that evolution will not come to a halt. But many currently living 
species will not endure it, the future of human societies will be jeopardized, 
and worthwhile intergenerational projects will have to be aborted. These are 
the things we typically value and care about, our subjects of ethical concern, 
the potential loss of which we regard as morally problematic. Therefore, in 
making an ethical claim about whether anthropogenic global warming is 
worrisome, we should focus on the endurance of these entities as our core 
concern. To answer the question of whether anthropogenic climate change is 
worrisome by pointing to changes that have occurred over the last hundred 
millions of years is to focus attention at issues that are irrelevant from a moral 
point of view, even if they are of great scientific interest.
This is an instance of a fallacy which I will dub ‘geological relativism’: 
the unwarranted trivialization of the ethical significance of climate change, 
due to selective attention for processes that occur or entities that endure 
only at geological timescales. The fallacy is easy to correct: Surely, from an 
ethical viewpoint, we should not selectively consider the impact of climate 
change on processes that unfold at geological timescales, since the processes 
and entities we care about exist at very different timescales. We typically 
care about processes that unfold over our own lifetime, as well as certain 
processes that go beyond that (e.g. Scheffler, 2016) – the future of countries, 
civilizations and intergenerational projects over the next couple of hundreds 
of years. Perhaps we might even value the persistence of ecosystems, or of 
certain cultural achievements and artefacts, over thousands of years. When 
we say that the future of our planet is at stake, these are the kinds of things 
we worry about. Broadening our perspective at logarithmic steps, we enter 
at timescales that rarely figure in what we ordinarily value, and surely, the 
multi-million-year processes of geological time cannot be taken as the default 
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temporal reference class for judging what matters. At the very least, a reason 
should be given to think that such vast timescales constitute the proper refer-
ence class for judging whether anthropogenic climate change is a worrisome 
phenomenon. Absent any such justification, ‘geological relativism’ should be 
regarded as a fallacy.
Something similar can be said about a sister-species of ‘geological rela-
tivism’, which I will call the fallacy of ‘Darwinian relativism’: the unwar-
ranted trivialization of the ethical significance of extinction, based on the 
fact that over eons of evolutionary time no species will persist. While this is 
scientifically correct, it does not follow that preserving species from going 
extinct during our lifetime is not a worthwhile endeavour. Of course, over 
long stretches of time, everything is in flux and nothing ever stays the same. 
But there can be quite some stability at shorter timescales, and these shorter 
timescales constitute the default temporal dimension against which we make 
judgements of value.
Returning to our general theme, the discussion in this section brings out 
that the intersection between evolutionary ethics and climate change is not 
necessarily virtuous. An evolutionary perspective may enrich our ethical 
framework, but it can also invite specific fallacies. Being wary about these 
fallacies is especially important in the context of discussions centring on the 
‘Anthropocene’, which is the name that some scientists give to a new geologi-
cal epoch that has recently begun, and which is characterized by the fact that 
human activities have become significant geological forces (Crutzen, 2002). 
Whether the Anthropocene should indeed be regarded as a new geological 
epoch, and whether the notion does not bring along unwarranted ideological 
presuppositions, are matters of scholarly contention (e.g. Baskin, 2015). But 
setting aside any such controversy, note that the conceptual framework of the 
Anthropocene suggests that human and geological timescales have become 
entangled. Given this entanglement, the fallacies of ‘geological relativism’ 
and ‘Darwinian relativism’ lure: they are the kinds of fallacies that the con-
ceptual framework of the Anthropocene easily invites.
The climate ethicist Stephen Gardiner has argued that the issue of climate 
change gives rise to various forms of ‘moral corruption’, which is, roughly, 
a tendency to rationalize immoral behaviour, to neglect the risks that climate 
change brings about, and a failure to be motivated by moral concerns, of 
which I will provide some examples in the next section (Gardiner, 2011). That 
climate change involves these convoluted problems makes it is all too easy to 
engage in manipulative or self-deceptive behaviour. I submit that ‘geological 
relativism’ and ‘Darwinian relativism’ can be regarded as instances of self-
deceptive – and morally corrupting – behaviour along these lines, as they 
involve looking away from pressing ethical concerns and focussing attention 
on matters that are of little moral significance. This is a possible pitfall of 
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looking at the issue of climate change through an evolutionary lens. A deep 
time perspective, while invaluable for scientific purposes, can be a distraction 
when coming to terms with our ethical predicament.
4 CLIMATE CHANGE AND EVOLUTIONARY MORAL 
PSYCHOLOGY
Thus far, we have focused mostly on findings from (pre-)history and the 
deep time perspective of geology, and assessed their (ir)relevance for climate 
ethics. We now turn to the field of moral psychology, where evolutionary 
considerations often loom large. Especially in popular writings, scientists 
regularly make claims about our evolved capacities to deal with the issue of 
climate change. The general tenor of these claims echoes the title of Mar-
shall’s (2014) book Don’t Even Think About It: Why Our Brains are Wired 
to Ignore Climate Change: We are evolutionarily ill-equipped to handle the 
problem. Consider the following three statements from a prominent science 
communicator, a philosopher and a psychologist:
•  Communicating climate change is a very tough problem. You know, 
it doesn’t trip the normal hormonal responses we evolved to protect 
ourselves with. You can’t see it, you can’t taste it, you can’t smell it. It 
appears to be in the distant future. (David Fenton on the podcast Climate 
One, 2018)
•  Evolution built us to respond to rapid movements of middle-sized 
objects, not to the slow build-up of insensible gases in the atmosphere. 
(Jamieson, 2014, p. 4)
•  Global warming doesn’t (. . .) violate our moral sensibilities. It doesn’t 
cause our blood to boil (at least not figuratively) because it doesn’t 
force us to entertain thoughts that we find indecent, impious or repul-
sive. (. . .) [I]t doesn’t make us feel nauseated or angry or disgraced, 
and thus we don’t feel compelled to rail against it as we do against 
other momentous threats to our species, such as flag burning. The fact 
is that if climate change were caused by gay sex, or by the practice of 
eating kittens, millions of protesters would be massing in the streets. 
(Gilbert, 2006)
How seriously should we take these admonitions? There is an ever-growing 
body of research on the topic of climate psychology, including work on the 
psychology of climate inaction (Markowitz & Shariff, 2012). This body of 
research suggests that there are indeed various cognitive biases and other psy-
chological obstacles to coping with the challenges that climate change poses. 
To name a few tendencies that are relevant in this context:
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• Climate change is often perceived as a distant and abstract threat and its 
impact is difficult to envision; as a result, it does not trigger a strong emo-
tional response (e.g. Marshall, 2014, pp. 55–7);
• People easily get habituated to gradual processes; crises that lack abrupt-
ness also lack psychological salience (e.g. Marshall, 2014, p. 48);
• People’s attention tends to be directed towards the short-term future; we are 
psychologically inclined to engage in temporal discounting (e.g. Jacquet, 
Hagel, Hauert, Marotzke, Röhl, & Milinski, 2013).
Psychological considerations along these lines underscore the risk of moral 
disengagement with the issue of climate change, and of disregarding the inter-
ests of future generations. Our moral psychology did not evolve in response 
to long-term threats and pressures for global cooperation, and as a result, 
achieving such cooperation is all the more challenging.
It should be emphasized, however, that to a substantial extent, these are 
malleable tendencies, rather than fixed features of human psychology. Con-
sider, for instance, the climate activist Greta Thunberg, whose ‘school strike 
for the climate’ got following worldwide, and who has publicly expressed 
emotions of anger, indignation and feelings of neglect.5 Apparently, climate 
change can trigger a strong emotional response and can be regarded as an 
urgent crisis, even motivating millions of protesters to mass the streets. The 
psychological obstacles to facing climate change may be real, but they are 
not absolute.
The practical upshot of climate psychology is that it can foster strategies 
to take away these obstacles and increase moral engagement. Consider the 
negative emotions around which Thunberg’s rhetoric revolves. Are these the 
most effective emotional buttons to push? Drawing on psychological find-
ings, Pölzler (2018, p. 13) argues that people are more likely to be motivated 
to take action when climate change is linked to positive emotions. By way of 
example, Pölzler proposes that we might practice extending the emotion of 
love universally to encompass non-human nature – a proposal reminiscent of 
some Buddhist meditative practices.
Myself, I think that the emotions of honour and pride, which have thus far 
not been central to climate discourse, might be powerful instigators of climate 
action. By this, I do not mean the pride (or disgrace) that future generations 
might feel towards us. The credits that fuel such pride will only be available 
in the long-term future, and I doubt whether a leap of imagination (‘what will 
your grandchildren say!’) is sufficiently effective to prompt action in the here 
5 See, for instance, her address at the United Nations Climate Action Summit of 23 Septem-
ber 2019. A video and transcript can be found at: www.npr.org/2019/09/23/763452863/transcript- 
greta-thunbergs-speech-at-the-u-n-climate-action-summit
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and now. Instead, I am thinking of pride in terms of the virtue we might bestow 
on individuals who are role models of low-carbon lifestyles, the national 
pride we might take in being leaders of a green energy transition, and taking 
pride in the fact that we, as a species, can cope with the momentous challenge 
we are facing, without being disheartened by the sacrifices we have to make 
along the way. Moreover, we can take pride in our historical achievements, 
and find value in their continued preservation – which, in the face of melt-
ing glaciers and rising sea levels, might well be in jeopardy. The enormous 
number of donations given to the Notre Dame after the near-catastrophic 
fire of 2019 illustrates that when icons of contemporary culture are at stake, 
people become quite willing to seriously invest in averting disaster.
What, then, is the relevance of evolutionary considerations for climate 
psychology? Many of the biases, tendencies and emotions discussed earlier 
have clear evolutionary underpinnings. For instance, emotions of honour and 
pride, which are intimately tied to reputation, have likely played a significant 
role in human moral evolution (e.g. Sperber & Baumard, 2012). Being aware 
of these evolutionary origins can help us to appreciate our psychological 
strengths and weaknesses, but such awareness is not essential to overcoming 
our blind spots. What is of practical significance in the context of climate 
psychology is understanding the mechanisms that can move us to climate 
action, not their evolutionary origins.
Moreover, an evolutionary perspective can also prove to be a moral con-
found, as it may give rise to an unwarranted form of ‘evoconservatism’: 
an unduly restrictive view of our potential for moral improvement, based 
on a failure to appreciate the cultural flexibility of our evolved tendencies 
(Buchanan & Powell, 2018). As I pointed out earlier, while there is good rea-
son to think that psychological presentism and lack of emotional engagement 
are obstacles to climate action, there is also good reason to think that these 
traits are quite flexible. The evolutionary origins of our moral blind spots may 
be telling, but can also mask how easily these blind spots might be overcome 
in the right institutional setting.
This appears to be an encouraging prospect. Institutional nudges might 
provide a feasible means for adapting our behaviour to act with greater sen-
sitivity to the moral perils of climate change. But I will end on a less hopeful 
note. Just like our moral emotions, our core societal institutions have not 
evolved in response to pressures of climate change. Instead, over the last 
two centuries, modern states have co-evolved with the fossil fuel industry, 
creating path-dependencies and lock-in effects that hinder social-ecological 
transformation (Brand & Wissen, 2018; Hausknost, 2020). Our means of 
transportation and networks of production and consumption are tailored to 
a carbon-intensive economy; our political institutions are focused on short-
term interests. I began this chapter, in section 2, by arguing that historical 
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experiences are key triggers of morally progressive societal adaptation. The 
fact that our core institutions have evolved in the absence of experiencing the 
harms of CO2 emissions, makes the societal transformation that is upon us all 
the more daunting.
5 CONCLUSION
In this chapter, I have explored some intersections between evolutionary eth-
ics and climate change. Examining the connections between these topics can 
deliver valuable insights, and gives rise to a variety of questions, undoubt-
edly many more than I have touched upon here. What the examples I have 
singled out in the foregoing sections illustrate is that an evolutionary lens, and 
a scientific outlook more generally, may both help and hinder ethical assess-
ments. When properly incorporated in our moral reference frame, a scientific 
perspective will certainly be beneficial. But a scientific perspective also has a 
potential to fuel moral blindsight and may invite fallacies of moral reasoning. 
Those venturing to further explore the intersections between evolutionary 
ethics and climate change should bear in mind both sides of this coin – the 
potential for virtuous interaction between ethics and science, as well as the 
potential for distortion, and need for correctives.
In conclusion, let me return to the overall theme of this volume and reflect 
on how the foregoing analysis relates to philosophy’s societal relevance. 
Above all, climate change is itself an issue of great societal relevance, which 
raises challenges – particularly in the field of ethics – to which philosophers 
directly contribute, for instance, by scrutinizing what counts as a fair dis-
tribution of the burdens of global CO2 reductions. But apart from this, and 
building on the foregoing discussion, let me highlight two further societal 
roles that academic philosophy can fulfil. First, many philosophers are trained 
in normative reasoning, well equipped to discern good from bad arguments, 
and have specific expertise in detecting formal and informal reasoning falla-
cies. As a result, philosophers are well positioned to function as gatekeepers 
of (non-technical) scholarly and public debates, pointing out fallacies and 
correcting popular misunderstandings, such as the ‘geological relativism’ of 
Salomon Kroonenberg. This role is not unlike that of journalists, but its focus 
is geared towards a different set of issues. While an important gatekeeping 
function of journalism is to correct for factual mistakes, a philosophical train-
ing will be specifically helpful in correcting mistaken interpretations of the 
overall balance of evidence, conflations of fact and value, or in pointing out 
conceptual ambiguities. This is by no means philosophy’s only societal task, 
but it is an important one, especially in an age where traditional editorial 
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filters have substantially weakened. Societal discourse needs critical scrutiny 
and philosophers are well equipped to provide it.6
Second, in this chapter, I have borrowed on findings from a number of 
different disciplines, with the aim of providing a general impression of long-
term risks of anthropogenic climate change, and of the obstacles we face in 
coming to terms with these risks. A fair number of academic philosophers 
(though by no means all of them) regularly undertake projects of this sort, 
as purported ‘experts of generality’, aspiring to synthesize knowledge from 
several disciplines. Interdisciplinary expertise, in turn, is a skill of great 
importance with regard to many of the complex challenges facing today’s 
societies. Related to the ability to integrate different bodies of knowledge, but 
more distinctive of the philosopher’s role in doing so is an ability to formu-
late overarching perspectives and advance all-things-considered normative 
judgements. Such perspectives and judgements are specifically important for 
purposes of science communication, which should serve to raise awareness 
among the general public of the pressing scientific questions of our age, as 
well as the ethical issues to which they give rise. While philosophers are not 
the only ones who may be qualified to integrate disciplinary perspectives and 
advance holistic judgements, a philosophical training does help to develop 
crucial skills towards this end.
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